

## Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1553

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EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: ECRP

SUBJ: CERP 0002 (AS AVAILABLE): EGYPTIAN RELATIONS WITH  
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

REF (A) STATE 249989, (C) 76 CAIRO 15925,

1. (SECRET) SUMMARY. DURING PAST YEAR, 1977, RELATIONS WITH  
USSR AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (EXCEPT ROMANIA) CONTINUED  
TO DETERIORATE. THIS WAS RESULT OF SOVIET UNIONS'S REFUSAL  
TO PROVIDE SPARE PARTS FOR EGYPTIAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT, ITS  
LACK OF RESPONSE TO EGYPTIAN REQUESTS FOR ACROSS-THE-BOARD DEBT  
RESCHEDULING, AND CONTINUED SOVIET MACHINATIONS IN AFRICA,  
WHICH ARE VIEWED BY SADAT AS DIRECTED AGAINST HIM PERSONALLY.  
ONLY AT CLOSE OF REPORTING PERIOD, WITH POSSIBILITY INCREASING  
THAT GENEVA CONF MAY BE RECONVENED WITH USSR AS CO-CHAIRMAN,  
HAS THERE BEEN ANY PERCEPTIBLE EFFORT ON PART OF EGYPTIANS TO  
AMELIORATE RELATIONS WITH SOVS. MILITARY RESUPPLY, HOWEVER,  
WILL CONTINUE TO BE YARDSTICK FOR MEASURING IMPROVEMENT IN  
RELATIONS. COTTON EMBARGO ANNOUNCED BY SADAT ON AUG 14 AGAINST  
SUSSR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN RETALIATION FOR THEIR ARMS EMBARGO HAS NOT  
YET BEEN IMPLEMENTED, DEMONSTRATING THAT ECONOMIC RELATIONS  
GENERALLY REMAIN INSULATED FROM VICISSITUDES OF POLITICAL RE-  
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LATIONS. EGYPTAINS, HOWEVER, LIKELY TO PRESS DURING 1978 TRADE  
PROTOCOL NEGOTIATIONS IN DEC FOR APPLIATION OF PART OF AGREED  
TRADE SURPLUS TO MILITARY DEBT. SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN CULTURAL  
ACTIVITIES WERE AT REDUCED LEVELS IN 1977 AS THESE COUNTRIES  
ADOPTED "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE IN LIGHT OF POLITICAL PROBLEMS.  
END SUMMARY

PART L. APPRAISAL OF POLITICAL MILITARY ECONOMIC RELATIONS

2. (SECRET) MILITARY RESUPPLY - MAJOR IRRITANT WITH USSR.  
AT BEGINNING OF 1977, EGYPTIANS STILL HAD 183 MIG-21 ENGINES IN  
SOVIET UNION FOR OVERHAUL. GOE HAD HOPED THAT FOMIN FAHMY'S  
JUNE VISIT TO MOSCOW WOULD BREAK SPARE PARTS/MILITARY SUPPLY  
IMPASSE. INSTEAD, SOVIETS INSISTED ALL PREVIOUS NEGOTIATED  
AGREEMENTS ARE VOID AND ADVISED FUTURE SALES WOULD BE FOR HARD  
CASH ONLY. WHICH EGYPTIANS ARE UNABLE PROVIDE. ADDITIONALLY,  
SOVIETS SOUGHT REESTABLISHMENT OF CLOSER POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP,  
WHICH WAS TO BE EMBODIED IN JOINT COMMUNIQUE APPROVED BY PA,  
AS QUID PRO QUO FOR REOPENING MILITARY PARTS PIPELINE. SADAT  
PUBLICLY REJECTED THESE DEMANDS. BY NOV, ONLY 50 MIG 21 ENGINES  
HAD BEEN RETURNED; REMAINDER APPEAR TO BE IN LIMBO. AS RESULT,  
EGYPT IS FORCED USE WESTERN EXPERTISE IN EFFORT KEEP ITS AIRCRAFT  
FLYING. EGYPTIANS PLACED ADDITIONAL BLAME ON SOVS FOR CZECH-  
OSLOVAKIA'S FAILURE TO FULFILL CONTRACT FOR SUPPLY OF TANKS.  
ONLY 30 OUT OF 240, REPORTEDLY ORDERED AND PAID FOR, HAVE BEEN  
DELIVERED. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT TOUGH SOV MILITARY SUPPLY  
POLICY HAS WEAKENED EGYPTIAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

3. (UNCLAS) IN RETALIATION FOR ARMS IMPASSE, SADAT, ON AUG  
14, DRAMATICALLY ANNOUNCED EMBARGO OF COTTON EXPORTS (UN-  
SPECIFIED WHETHER ONLY RAW COTTON OR ALL TEXTILE EXPORTS  
AFFECTED) TO USSR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. IN SAME SPEECH, EGYPTIAN  
PRESIDENT UNILATERALLY DECLARED TEN YEAR MORATORIUM ON EGYPTIAN  
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REPAYMENT OF SOV MILITARY DEBTS AND INSTRUCTED GOVT SEEK RESCHED-  
ULING OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OBLIGATIONS TO USSR.

4. (CONF) SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA POSE ADDITIONAL THREAT.  
THROUGHOUT REPORTING PERIOD SADAT REPEATEDLY AND PUBLICLY BLAMED  
USSR FOR VIRTUALLY ALL TROUBLE ARISING IN AFRICA. HE DISPATCHED  
SOME LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO ZAIRE IN EFFORT AID MOBUTO  
TO COMBAT INSURGENCY, PROVIDED LIMITED MILITARY HARDWARE TO CHAD  
AND SOMALIA, AND GAVE SUDAN UNQUALIFIED GUARANTEE OF EGYPTIAN  
MILITARY SUPPORT AGAINST EXTERNAL THREAT. IN SADAT'S VIEW,  
USSR HAS EXPLOITED RELATIVE US DISINTEREST IN BLACK AFRICA DURING  
RECENT YEARS TO EXPAND SOVIET SPHERE OF INFLUENCE AND CHALLENGE NEW  
US ADMINISTRATION. ASIDE FROM SIMPLY EXPANDING INFLUENCE, SADAT  
HAS CONCLUDED SOVIET GOAL IS TO SURROUND EGYPT WITH RING OF RADICAL  
STATES WITH ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF TOPPLING HIM FROM POWER  
AND PLACING MORE MALLEABLE LEADER IN EGYPT. PRESIDENT HAS EX-  
PRESSED INABILITY UNDERSTAND WHY USG IS UNWILLING TO CONFRONT MORE  
FORCEFULLY SOVIET CHALLENGE IN AFRICA AND HAS REPEATEDLY URGED  
US SUPPLY US EQUIPMENT TO SOMALIA AND CHAD, EITHER DIRECTLY OR VIA  
EGYPT.

5. (SECRET) LIBYAN/SOVIET HOSTILITY LED TO MINI WAR. SADAT HAS

VIEWED QADHAFI AS SOVIET TOOL IN ALL OF ABOVE MACHINATIONS. LIBYA'S SUBVERSION IN EGYPT, INTERVENTION IN CHAD, ITS ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW NUMAIRY, AND ITS SUPPORT FOR ETHIOPIA ALL ARE VIEWED AS SUPPORTIVE OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES. EGYPT'S RELATIVELY STRONG ATTACK ON LIBYA IN JULY, REGARDLESS OF IMMEDIATE PROVOCATION, UNDOUBTEDLY GREW PARTIALLY OUT OF SADAT'S FRUSTRATION WITH HIS RELATIVE INABILITY TO CONFRONT SOVIET-LIBYAN ACTIVITIES ELSEWHERE IN CONTINENT. EGYPTIANS EASILY WON FIGHTING BUT, AS RESULT, APPEARED TO BECOME MORE ISOLATED IN ARAB CAMPT. SADAT WAS PARTICULARLY BITTER OVER FACT THAT OTHERS WHO HAD BEEN BOJECT OF QADHAFI-SPONSORED TERRORISM KID NOT PUBLICLY SUPPORT HIS ATTMEPT "TEACH QADHAFI A LESSON." IN FIGHTING, EGYPT TOOK PARTICULAR SATISFACTION AT KNOCKING OUT SEVERAL RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS, REPORTEDLY KILLING AT LEAST THREE SOV  
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ADVISERS. FOLLOWING FIGHTING, SADAT ACCUSED USSR OF JAMMING EGYPTIAN COMMUNICATIONS DURING THE FRACAS.

6. (SECRET) SOV BLAMED FOR JAN RIOTS. INTERNALLY, SADAT BLAMED COMMUNISTS (SOV-SUPPORTED) FOR EXTENSIVE JAN 77 RIOTS THROUGHOUT EGYPT. MOST EXPLICITLY, SADAT ON JAN 31 DECLARED "SOVIET UNION BEHIND EVERYTHING THAT TOOK PLACE...BLOODY CONFLICT IS BASIC PRINCIPLE OF SOVIET UNION." OUR ANALYSIS IS THAT INITIALLY DEMONSTRATIONS REPRESENTED TRUE EXPRESSION OF FRUS-TRATION WITH ECONOMIC SITUATION. WELL-ORGANIZED COMMUNISTS AND RIGHTISTS WERE ABLE EXPLOIT SITUATION IN FEW HOURS AND TURN DEM-ONTRATIONS INTO DESTRUCTIVE ANTI-REGIME RIOTS. RIOTS TEMPORARILY WEAKENED REGIME, WHICH WAS CAUSE FOR CONVERN REGARDING ITS ABILITY TO CONTINUE PEACE PROCESS. REGIME RECOVERED, BUT NOT WITHOUT MAKING ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS.

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7. (SECRET) SIGNS OF THAW? ONLY IN PAST MONTH HAVE WE SEEN ANY SIGN OF POSSIBLE ATTEMPT AMELIORATE EGYPTIAN-SOV RELATIONS, AND THIS DIRECTLY TIED TO POSSIBILITY OF RECONVENED GENEVA CONF. EDITORIALS RECENTLY HAVE SUGGESTED PRUDENCE OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH ONE OF CONFERENCE'S CO-CHAIRMEN PRIOR TO MEETING AND THERE HAS BEEN SOME LOWERING OF PROPAGANDA DECIBLL LEVEL. EGYPTIANS WERE QUICK TO POINT OUT TO MORE REJECTIONIST BROTHERS THAT JOINT US-USSR STATEMENT ON ME DEMONSTRATED SOVIETS NOT PREPARED TO GO FURTHER THAN AMERICANS IN SUPPORTING ARAB INTERESTS. THIS WAS DIFFICULT PROPAGANDA HORSE FOR EGYPTIANS TO RIDE: IT IS UNSEEMLY FOR THEM TAKE UNDUE GLEE AT SOVIET BAKDOWN ON QUESTION AFFECTING ARAB RIGHTS BUT, AT SAME TIME, THEY WISH TO DEMONSTRATE WISDOM SADAT'S OVERALL RELIANCE ON US.

8. (SECRET) REAL IMPROVEMENT UNLIKELY. WE DO NOT FORSEE ANY DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENT IN OVERALL EGYPTIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE SO LONG AS SADAT REMAINS IN OFFICE.

TOO MANY ACCUSATIONS HAVE BEEN LEVELED, AND TOO MANY CONCRETE ACTS TAKEN, FOR THERE TO BE REAPPROCHMENT UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP. SOME EASING OF RELATIONS IS POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY IF SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN AT GENEVA, BUT OVERALL TIES ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN STRAINED. KEY ISSUES IN THIS REGARD WILL CONTINUE TO BE SOME FORM  
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OF DEBT RESCHEDULING AND MILITARY SPARES. WHILE EGYPT IS UNLIKELY IN FUTURE BECOME SOLEY DEPENDENT UPON SOVUNION FOR MILITARY HARDWARE. LEADERS ARE KEENLY AWARE THAT ONLY USSR CAN MEET FULLY EGYPT'S PARTS REQUIREMENTS IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE. SOVIET WILLINGNESS DO THIS, OR PERMIT OTHERS (EAST EUROPEANS/INDIANS) TO CARRY OUT ROLE, WILL BE YARDSTICK AGAINST WHICH EGYPTIANS WILL MEASURE FUTURE RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW.

9. (CONF) CHINA COOPERATES. IN CONTRAST TO RELATIONS WITH USSR, EGYPTIAN TIES WITH CHINA HAVE IMPROVED DURING PAST YEAR. THERE IS A LARGE COINCIDENCE OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ON AFRICAN ISSUES, WITH CHINA, TOO, OPPOSING VIRTUALLY ALL SOVIET ACTIVITIES. CHINA HAS PROVIDED EGYPT WITH SOME MILITARY EQUIPMENT, BUT WE ARE UNABLE TO QUANTIFY THIS. THIS EQUIPMENT HAS NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT TO MAKE UP FOR SOVIET EMBARGO; EGYPTIANS NONETHEL  
ESS  
HAVE GONE OUT OF THEIR WAY TO PRAISE PEKING'S EFFORTS.

10. (CONF) ROMANIAN CONNECTION FIRM. EGYPT AND ROMANIA WERE BOTH EAGER TO KEEP THEIR POLITICAL CONNECTION FIRM IN 1977. ALTHOUGH PROFILE OF THEIR RELATIONS NOT EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH, SADAT AND CEAUSESCU EXCHANGED VISITS MARKED BY CORDIALITY AND POLITICAL SUBSTANCE. CEAUSESCU'S BRIEF VISIT TO CAIRO IN MAY WAS MEDIA EVENT WITH TANGIBLE RESULTS CONFINED TO ECONOMIC SPHERE. ON THAT OCCASION, AS ON SADAT'S BUCHAREST VISIT IN LATE OCT, IDENTIFY OF VIEWS ON ME EAS DOMINANT THEME. WHILE CEAUSESCU MAY FANCY HIMSELF AS BACK CHANNEL TO ISRAEL OR MEDIATOR, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT SADAT

IS ACTIVELY SEEKING USE THIS CHANNEL. SADAT NEVERTHELESS ATTACHING CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONS WITH CEAUSESCU AND ROMANIAN HELPFULNESS ON ME IS APPRECIATED. MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP IS ALSO PRESUMABLY EGYPTIAN GOAL. SADAT WAS FOLLOWED SHORTLY TO BUCHAREST BY HIS ARMY CHIEF OS STARF.

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ROMANIAN ABILITY TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE IS, HOWEVER, LIMITED. ROMANIANS, FOR THEIR PART, HAVE MADE SERIOUS EFFORT TO HAVE THEIR VOICE HEARD ON ME, PRESUMABLY WITH AIM OF EXPANDING THEIR INFLUENCE IN REGION AND POSSIBLY SECURE A ROLE IN PEACE GUARANTEES. EGYPTIANS, TOO, MIGHT BE ABLE TO SERVE AS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LINK TO SAUDIS. ROMANIANS ALSO PROVIDING SOME PROJECT AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BUT PRIVATELY ARE SHARPLY CRITICAL OF EGYPTIAN HANDLING OF THEIR PROGRAM.

11. (CONF) ECONOMIC RELATIONS REMAIN STABLE. PERIOD FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT OF COTTON EMBARGO WAS CHARACTERIZED BY CONFUSION AS EVERYONE WAITED FOR SOVIET REACTION. AS FAR AS WE CAN DETERMINE, HOWEVER, EMBARGO WAS NOT ENFORCED. LACK OF IMPLEMENTATION, AT LEAST UP TO THIS TIME, OF ANNOUNCED EMBARGO IS GOOD INDICATION OF CONTRAST IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE USSR/OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC OFFICIALS KNOW THAT SOVIET EXPORTS TO EGYPT PROVIDE IMPORTANT RAW MATERIALS FOR EGYPTIAN INDUSTRY. EGYPTIAN EXPORTS TO USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE NOT ONLY HELP TO PAY OFF ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL DEBT, BUT ALSO PROVIDE CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF JOBS IN INDUSTRIES WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE FOLD BECAUSE STYLE AND QUALITY ARE NOT UP TO STANDARDS OF WESTERN EXPORT MARKETS. WHETHER ON INSTRUCTIONS OR OTHERWISE, LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS EFFECTIVELY IGNORE HIGH LEVEL PRONOUNCEMENTS WHICH WOULD TEND TO INTERRUPT ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP, ESPECIALLY IN TRADE SPHERE. DURING PAST FEW YEARS EGYPTIANS HAVE ALTERED TRADE WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES EITHER BY SWITCHING TO HARD CURRENCY EXCHANGE TERMS OR, IN CASE USSR ESPECIALLY, BY MATCHING COTTON AND OTHER POTENTIAL HARD CURRENCY EXPORTS AGAINST GOODS FROM USSR FOR WHICH THEY WOULD HAVE TO PAY HARD CURRENCY ELSEWHERE. MAINTENANCE OF TRADE RELATIONSHIP THEREFORE IMPORTANT. SOVS, FOR THEIR PART, APPEAR (AT LEAST UP TO NOW) EQUALLY WILLING NOT TO RETALIATE AGAINST POLITICAL PRONOUNCEMENTS

WITH DIRECT ECONOMIC PRESSURE. DESPITE PRESS REPORTS OF SLOWDOWN IN SOVIET DELIVERIES UNDER THE 1977 PROTOCOL, THERE IS EVIDENCE, THAT THE AGREEMENT IS BEING IMPLEMENTED ROUTINELY.

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12. (CONF) NO NEW AID AGREEMENTS. ALTHOUGH NO NEW AID AGREEMENTS WERE REPORTED BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE USSR OR EASTERN EUROPE DURING THE YEAR, SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO THE NAG AL-HAMADI ALUMINUM COMPLEX APPEARS TO BE CONTINUING IN NAORMAL FASHION. ACCORDING RECENT CONTRACTS WITH SOVEMBOFF, THERE ARE ABOUT TWO HUNDRED SOV TECHNICIANS AT NAG AL-HAMADI, WITH ANOTHER EIGHT HUNDRED SPREAD AROUND EGYPT AT OTHER SOV AID PROJECTS SUCH AS HELWAN IRON AND STEEL PLANT.

13. 1977 TRADE. AT ANNUAL TRADE PROTOCOL WITH THE USSR WAS FINALLY SIGNED IN CAIRO ON 29 MARCH 77, AFTER REPEATED DALAYS. AGREEMENT CALLS FOR TWO WAY TRADE TRADE VALUED AT 342 MILLION POUNDS STERLING (UP 22 MILLION POUNDS STERLING FROM 1976) CONSISTING OF 212 MILLION POUNDS STERLING EGYPTIAN EXPORTS AND 130 MILLION POUNDS STERLING IMPORTS FROM USSR. SIGNING OF TRADE PROTOCOL MARKED HIGH POINT OF USSR-GOE RELATIONS DURING YEAR, ALTHOUGH BY MID SUMMER EGYPTIANS WERE COMPLAINING (WE COULD NOT SUBSTANTIATE THESE COMPLAINTS) OF SLOW DOWN IN SOVIEIT DELIVERIES OF GOODS. MOST EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WERE INVOLVED DURING REPORTING PERIOD IN BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO STANDARD TRADE PROTOCOLS. CZECHOLLOVAKIA SIGNED A CLEARING ACCOUNT ARRANGEMENTS WITH EGPT IN MID DEC 76. AST SAME TIME CUBA CONCLUDED A THREE YEAR SUGAR AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH EGYPT WILL IMPORT 360,000 TONS OF SUGAR PER YEAR. A JAN 77 PROTOCOL WAS SIGNED WITH POLAND VALUED AT \$100 MILLION (UP \$20 MILLION FROM 76). PRESS REPORTED MARCH 21 SIGNING TRADE PROTOCOL WITH THE PRC; NO FIGURES WERE GIVEN. ALBANIA SIGNED CONVERTIBLE CURRENCY PROTOCOL IN JUNE WITH A TOTAL TRADE VOLUME OF LE 7 MILLION.

14. (SECRET) 1978 TRADE RELATED TO MILITARY DEBT. IN HIS REPORT TO THE PA IN LATE MAY, DEPPRIMIN KAISSOUNI ASSERTED THAT NEARLY

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ALL COMMERCIAL DEBT TO USSR HAD BEEN PAID OFF AND THAT THEY ARE CURRENT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LOAN REPAYMENTS. EGYPTIAN TRADE SURPLUSES IN PAST FEW YEARS (DERIVING MAINLY FROM HIGH PRICE SOVIETS PAID FOR COTTON) APPEAR TO HAVE MADE THHIS IMPROVED USSR ECONOMIC DEBT SITUATION POSSIBLE. ON OCT 30 KAISSOUNI SAID "CIVILIAN DEBT" AMOUNTED TO NOT MORE THAN LE 217 MILLION.

QUESTION OF DEBT RESCHEDULING, THEREFORE, EVIDENTLY LARGELY AFFECTS ONLY MILITARY DEBT. WE WOULD EXPECT EGYPTAIANS TO TRY TO GET SOME AGREEMENT DURING 1978 TRADE PROTOCOL NEGOTIAION TO APPLY AGREED TRADE SURPLUS TO MILITARY DEBT AS MINIMUM DEMAND. IF SOVS PROVE UNCOOPERATIVE, EGYPTIANS WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER REDUCTION OF EXPORTS IN ORDER NOT TO RUN UP USELESS CREDITS. PRECISE DATE FOR BEGINNING OF PROTOCOL TRADE TALKS ARE NOT SET, ALTHOUGH BOTH MIN OF TRADE AND SOVEMB INSIST THEY WILL TAKE PLACE AS SCHEDULED IN MID DEC.

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15. MILITARY ASSISTANCE. INFO AVAILABLE IN CAIRO REGARDING MILASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN EGYPT AND COMMUNIST COUNTRIES IS VER LIMITED. NO NEW MILITARY ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS ARE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN SIGNED DURING 1977. WE BLIEVE SOV ASSISTANCE FOR MIG 23'S HAS TERMINATED AND THESE AIRCRAFT ARE RAPIDLY BECOMING UNSUPPORTABLE.SOME EVIDENCE SUGGETS A SHIPMENT OF OVERHAULD R-11 MIG-21 ENGINES MAY HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FROM EAST GERMANY. ALSO IT IS BELIEVED THAT DURING 1977 AT LEAST ONE SHIP- MENT OF OVERHAULED MIG 21 ENGINES WAS RECEIVED FROM THE SOVUNION. (AS YEAR ENDED, THERE WERE SOME SIGNS THAT SOVS CONCERNED ABOUT WIDER RAMIFICATIONS OF WEST EUROPEAN LED PROJECT FOR MAINTAINING EGYPT'S MIG FLEET AND THAT SOVS MIGHT BE SEEKING WAYS, INCLUDING TRETURNING REPAIRED ENGINES TO EGYPT, TO BLOCK IT.)

16. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE ADDITIONAL PRC SUPPORT FOR MIG 17 AIRCRAFT AND DELIVERY OF SOME UNIDENTIFIED "LONG RANGE ROCKETS." THIS MAY BE MORE AID DELIVERED AS RESULT OF VP MUBAREK'S VISIT CO THINA IN 1976. CZECHOLOVALIA DELIVERED AN INITIAL SHIPMENT OF 30 T55 TANKS DURING 77, WHICH IS PART OF AN AGREEMENT

TO PROVIDE A TOTAL OF 240 TANKS. CZECHS INSIST THAT, DUE TO PRODUCTION PROBLEMS, BALANCE OF TANKS CANNOT NOW BE DELIVERED; HOWEVER, REASON IS MORE LIKELY POLITICAL PRESSURE FROM USSR.

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17. THERE ARE FEW, IF ANY, COMMUNIST MILITARY TECHNICIANS LEFT IN EGYPT. AS CONTRACTS HAVE EXPIRED THE TECHNICIANS HAVE DEPARTED WITHOUT BEING REPLACED. THERE ARE NO EGYPTIAN STUDENTS KNOWN TO BE STUDYING IN MILITARY SCHOOLS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

PART IV

18. CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL RELATIONS. CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES OF BLOC COUNTRIES DURING THE PAST YEAR WERE, WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS, MOSTLY LOW KEY. THOSE COUNTRIES MAINTAINING CULTURAL CENTERS IN EGYPT APPEAR TO HAVE ADOPTED A HOLDING POSITION, IN READINESS FOR ANY CHANGE IN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT.

19. THE ONE EXCEPTIONAL PERFORMANCE WAS SOV JAN 77 CAIRO INTERNATIONAL BOOK FAIR DISPLAY. INSTEAD OF EXHIBITING ALONG WITH OTHER NATIONS IN COMMON PAVILLION, SOVS RENTED LARGE, CONSPICUOUS AND SEPARATE HALL ON FAIR GROUNDS. OTHER COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING EXHIBITED BOOKS THAT WERE AVAILABLE ONLY THROUGH CAIRO COMMERCIAL BOOKS REPS. SOVS, ON THE OTHER HAND, HANDLED DIRECT CASH SALES. ATTENDANCE AT SOV EXHIBITION WAS PROBABLY SAME AS OR A LITTLE HIGHER THAN VISITORS TO EXHIBITIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES, BUT QUALITY OF SOV ATTENDANCE WAS NO HIGHER. FEW PROFESSORS OR PROFESSIONALS WERE NOTED BROWSING FOR BOOKS; THERE WAS A RESPECTABLE NUMBER OF UNIV STUDENTS BUYING INEXPENSIVE SCIENCE BOOKS IN ENGLISH. MAJOR SALES AT THE SOV PAVILLION WERE IN CLASSICAL MUSIC RECORDINGS AND IN INEXPENSIVE REPRODUCTIONS OF PAINTINGS IN SOV MUSEUMS, AS WELL AS IN CHILDREN'S BOOKS. EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES DID REQUEST SOV REPS TO REMOVE SEVERAL BOOKS FROM DISPLAY BECAUSE THEY WERE POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE.

20. THE ONLY SOV EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL SPECIALISTS NOW REMAINING IN EGYPTIAN INSTITUTIONS ARE TEACHERS AT THE CAIRO

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CONSERVATOIRE, A CLASSICAL MUSIC HIGHER INSTITUTE SUPPORTED BY THE MIN OF CULTURE. DURING CONTINUING CRISIS OVER SOV REFUSAL TO ASSIST EGYPT WITH SPARES FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT, LOCAL RUMOR HAD IT THAT THESE LAST VESTIGES OF SOV CULTURAL INFLUENCE WOULD BE EXPELLED. MUSICIANS ARE STILL HERE, HOWEVER, AND TEACHING



AT THE CONSERVATOIRE, BUT THEIR POSITION MUST BE VIEWED AS TENUOUS. PRES OF ACADEMY OF ARTS, TO WHICH CONSERVATOIRE IS AFFILIATED, APPARENTLY CONTINUES TO PLAN TO CUT SOV CONNECTION ENTIRELY. THIS HAD ALREADY BEEN DONE AT THE BALLET SCHOOL, WHERE SOV-TRAINED EGYPTIAN DANCERS HAVE NOW ASSUMED FULL TEACHING RESPONSIBILITY IN PLACE OF SOVNATIONALS.

21. MAJOR BLOCK CULTURAL PRESENTATIONS WERE FEW AND FAR BETWEEN THIS YEAR. CHINESE BROUGHT GOUP OF ACROBATS HICH HAD POPULAR APPEAL. EAST GERMANS RECENTLY BROUGH IN VERY GOOD FOLK DANCE TROUP AND BERLIN OPERA COMPANY BALLET. ROMANIANS ALSO BROUGHT HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL FOLD DANCE TROUPE. AS WITH MOST OTHER COUNTRIES, EAST OR WEST, SUCH CULTURAL PRESENTATIONS ARE GENERALLY CO-SPONSORED BY THE MIN OF CULTURE.

22. SOVUNION, EAST GERMANY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA MAINTAIN THE MOST ACTIVE BLOC CULTURAL CENTERS IN CAIRO. BOTH SOVS AND EGERMANS CONDUCT LANGUAGE TEACHING OPERATIONS, ALTHOUGH INTEREST IN RUSSIAN LANGUAGE HAS GREATLY DIMINISHED. SOVUNION, WHILE HAVING SOME LIBRARY OPERATIONS, PRIMARLY PRESENTS FILM SHOWINGS, A REGULAR WEEKLY PROGRAM OF RECORDED CLASSICAL MUSIC, AND OCCASIONAL LECTURERS OR PERFORMANING ARTISTS. FEW LECTURES BROUGH ESPECIALLY FROM THE SOVUNIION HAVE BEEN PROGRAMMED; CULTURAL CENTER INSTEAD DRAWS ON SOVEMB STAFF.

23. USSR AND BLOC COUNTRIES ARE MOST REBUFFED IN FIELD OF EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE. EVEN IN BEST OF TIMES, EGYPT REFUSED TO SEND GRADUATE STUDENTS IN HUMANTIES AND LETTERS TO USSR OR BLOC COUNTRIES. EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING GRANTS TO BLOC COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO BE ONLY IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. SOVUNION REPORTEDLY OFFERS UPWARDS 500 GRADUAE OR UNDER-GRAD SCHOLARSHIPS  
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VERY YEAR TO MIN OF EDUCATION, BUT ONLY HANDRUL OF EGYPTIANS UNDERTAKE STUDIES THERE. ACCORDING TO MIN OF EDUCATION OFFICIAL, DURING FORMAL 1976-77 ACADEMIC YEAR, THERE WERE 10 EGYPTIAN STUDENTS IN SOV UNIVS FINISHING PH STUDIES, AND 12 ON TECHNICAL TRAINING PROGRAMS. THWERE WERE NINE STUDENTS UNDERTAKING TRAINING AND STUDY IN EGERMANY, SEVEN I HUNGARD, FIVE IN ROMANIA AND THREE IN BLUGARIA. (NOTE: THESE FIGURES ARE SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER THAN THOSE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED BY USG. MINEDUCATION MAY BE COUNTING ONLY THOSE FORMAL STUDENTS AND NOT STUDENTS STUYDING IN THE THE TRADES.  
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**Decaption Date:** 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Note:**  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1977CAIRO18810  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
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**Reference:** 77 STATE 249989, 76 CAIRO 15925  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
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**Subject:** CERP 0002 (AS AVAILABLE): EGYPTIAN RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES  
**TAGS:** ECRP, EG  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/9c550c1d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009